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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee

SEC0M-M-260

22 November 1982

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Minutes
Two Hundred and Fifty-sixth Meeting
Wednesday, 17 November 1982, 1000 - 1200 Hours
Room 4E64, Langley Headquarters Building

Chairman
Presiding

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MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. Lloyd E. Dean, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Col. Donald A. Press, Department of the Army
Mr. D. Jerry Rubino, Department of Justice
Mr. Richard Welch, Department of the Navy

ALTERNATES PRESENT

Lt. Col. Raymond E. Abel, Department of the Air Force
Mr. Robert C. Allen, Department of the Navy
[redacted] National Security Agency
Mr. Edward J. Dansereau, Department of the Treasury (Secret Service)
Mr. Frank Dill, Department of the Army
[redacted] Defense Intelligence Agency
[redacted] Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Roger T. Smith, Department of the Air Force
Mr. Robert Wingfield, Department of Energy

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ALSO PRESENT

Mr. Robert S. Andrews, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force
[redacted] Central Intelligence Agency
[redacted] Central Intelligence Agency
[redacted] Central Intelligence Agency
[redacted] National Security Agency
[redacted] Central Intelligence Agency
[redacted] Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Donald Stigers, Department of State
[redacted] Defense Intelligence Agency
[redacted] Executive Secretary

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Preliminary Comments

The Chairman:

1. Noted that many of the items dealt with at the October seminar had been the subjects of follow-up action:

a. Technical Surveillance Countermeasures policy -- In response to SECOM referral to them of IG/CM tasking, the Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Subcommittee drafted a paper finding that there is de facto national policy on TSCM, and concluding (by a 9 to 1 vote) that there is no need for national level action in this area. [] said [] would discuss this further during the subcommittee reports. []

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b. COMSEC threats -- A memo from the CIA Director of Communications was sent to SECOM members for information. It assesses threats to CIA and other U. S. Government communications security from hostile actions or efforts identified in the NSSD-2 study. []

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c. SCI Adjudicators' conferences -- [] is preparing a survey of conference attendees and their supervisors to determine how Community agencies have benefited from this series. []

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d. Physical security officers conference -- [] is preparing a strawman curriculum for this proposed course. It will be sent to members for comment. []

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e. Polygraph training -- Messrs. Anderson, [] have discussed the possibility of a Community polygraph school. They believe the prospects for it are favorable. []

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f. Damage assessment policy -- [] paper on this was sent to members for comment. Responses from eight had been received as of this meeting. Their content varies, with a majority favoring something more specific in the way of guidance, but with some of those asking for further exploration of such things as the proposed central data base. [] asked those members who have not commented on this to do so promptly, so [] can respond to the IG/CM tasking. When all responses are in, members will be advised of the results. []

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g. DCID 1/14 period of coverage -- The OSD proposal to reduce it from 15 to 10 years will be addressed at an early 1983 SECOM meeting, in conjunction with discussion of DCID 1/14 revision. []

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h. Leaks -- A number of actions are underway:

(1) Memoranda are en route to the DCI recommending that he:

(a) Offer the Attorney General the services of the SECOM UDIS to help screen intelligence leaks for possible FBI investigation; and

(b) Reprogram funds to support leak countermeasures, such as establishment of a central data base and a study of the long-term effects of leaks.

(2) [] proposals for briefings and letters:

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(a) The Security Awareness Subcommittee has been tasked to review Community SCI briefing programs and materials and recommend changes they see needed;

(b) Item 3 on today's agenda is a proposal by [] on a possible Community team to study the effects of leaks to support security briefings for those with SCI access; and

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(c) [] took responsibility for providing specific guidance on cautionary letters to persons holding SCI access.

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(3) He sent the DCI a proposed letter to Judge Clark seeking Presidential approval of as many as possible of the [] Report recommendations. (The letter was not sent. The matter will be mentioned to Judge Clark at one of the regularly scheduled meetings between him and the DCI.) []

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2. Advised that an arrangement has been worked out with the FBI for them to assume responsibility for dealing with the Capitol Police and Legislative Branch officials on Hill technical security. He said he had scheduled a 22 November meeting with Mr. Dean to transfer responsibility. Mr. Welch asked Col. Press about the status of Army provision of technical security support to sensitive Defense testimony on an interim basis. Col. Press said they had deferred action until now so as not to interfere with the agreement on this matter just reached between the DDCI and the Assistant Director of the FBI.

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3. Said some members of the Industrial Security Working Group (ISWG) - made up of senior security officers from SCI contractors - had visited him recently and had asked him to speak to one of their meetings. He asked for members' views on this. Members indicated they had no concerns about it. [] said he would limit his remarks to relatively general treatment of SECOM activities, and would emphasize to them that his appearance should not be construed as conferring any SECOM status on the ISWG. [] asked if the ISWG excluded any contractors who should be able to profit from its security deliberations. [] said he understood that the ISWG was open to any firm which holds SCI contracts; hence there should be no problem of exclusivity. []

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4. Noted that the August SECOM meeting addressed the issue of contractor operation of all-source communication centers in connection with the Department of Energy's plan to contract out such operation pursuant to OMB Circular A-76. [] noted that SECOM concluded that this would be an unacceptable security risk. One of the items resulting from that issue was a DCI letter to OMB asking them to caution department and agency heads against contracting for services where it would result in unnecessarily broad access to intelligence or impair the control of sensitive intelligence data. He said Mr. Donohue of OMB had talked to him about this, and had said OMB did not plan to make a formal reply in order not to provide a potential basis for challenging the merits of OMB's basic contracting out policy. Mr. Donohue advised on that occasion that OMB had no problem with the DCI setting rules governing contractor access to SCI. [] noted that this issue seemed to be closed. []

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5. Asked those members who had not done so to send in their vote sheets on the proposed revisions of DCIDs 1/17 and 1/20. []

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6. Reported that three members of the House Appropriations Committee survey and Investigation Team had visited him the previous week to discuss their survey of the Defense Investigative Service (DIS). [] said he had replied to their questions by noting that DIS for some time had been asked to do more than it was equipped to provide; by observing that the IBI is a valuable adjunct to but not a substitute for a background investigation; and by stating that if DIS got the resources it needed, it shouldn't have to rely on the IBI. []

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7. Advised that Ms. Carol Patrick, a PFIAB staff member, had visited him on 4 November to discuss responses to the 1979 HPSCI report on personnel security. [] said he gave her an orientation on SECOM's mission, composition and activities, and offered opportunity for the PFIAB staff to review at a later meeting some of the SECOM-developed security briefings. []

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ITEM 1 Approval of Minutes

In the absence of requests for change, the minutes of the last meeting, held on 15 September 1982, were approved as written. []

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ITEM 2 Subcommittee Reports

A. Security Advisory Group USSR --

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B. Personnel Security -- [] reported that they had completed their review of DCID 1/14. This resulted in reiterating support for the draft revision approved in December 1981 with changes to replace the term SIO by SOIC, to add a definitions section consistent with the approved revision of DCID 1/19, and to add a paragraph authorizing SOICs to use the polygraph "in conjunction with access to SCI." [] said the polygraph provision was viewed by the 12 to 1 majority as a positive, flexible improvement. He advised that OSD's proposal to reduce the scope of investigative coverage from 15 to 10 years had been rejected by an 8 to 5 vote. He stated that the draft revision would be submitted to the SECQM Chairman following receipt of the OSD written dissent on the polygraph provision. [] also reported that 23 adjudicators had attended the seventh running of the SCI Adjudicators' Conference, bringing the total who had taken that course to 149. The next conference will be 7-11 March 1983. He thanked those who helped present the recent conference, and advised that a survey questionnaire would soon be sent to all attendees and their immediate supervisors. Lastly, [] reported that subcommittee members are monitoring developments in the planned revision of E.O. 10450 and in OPM's plan for a 5-tier set of personnel security standards. []

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C. Technical Surveillance Countermeasures -- [] reported that the subcommittee met on 26 October to discuss a proposed report on the issue of national TSCM policy. He said they were scheduled to meet on 18 November to discuss a new draft which describes extant policy and concludes that it is sufficient. He noted that NSA is writing a dissent reflecting their conclusion that more policy guidance is needed. [] said a concern of most TSCS members was that if national policy required all agencies which handle classified material to have TSCM programs, the TSCM system used by Community agencies could become overburdened and less effective. As examples, he noted that less data on finds and state-of-the-art technology would be shared because of need-to-know if non-NFIB agencies obtained access to the TSCS; and [] would not be able to satisfy Community needs if non-NFIB agencies used it to train their own TSCM cadres. He advised that NSA cited the "Taylormaid" report as supporting the need for a national TSCM policy. [] commented that the report does not seem to satisfy its purpose of providing specific threat data. He said the report's recommendations do not seem to be supported

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by data presented in it. He noted that one recommendation was to treat technical threats as a package, tying together TSCM, TEMPEST, computer security and other technical penetration concerns. [redacted]

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ITEM 3 Possible Study of Leak Effects

[redacted] related that members had discussed at the October seminar possible forms of a Community task force to assess the impact of leaks. He advised that efforts to obtain funds to contract such an assessment had been unsuccessful so far. He noted member agreement to limit the study to a small number of topics which lent themselves to demonstration of cause and effect; and member offers to provide manpower for a task force.

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[redacted] invited attention to [redacted] proposal on this subject that had been sent out with the agenda, and said members needed to discuss and agree upon a topic or topics for study, contributions members are willing to make available for the purpose, and the degree of access the task force would be given to agency data showing the impact of leaks. [redacted]

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[redacted] commented that leak-effect studies are usually done so soon after the event that sufficient time has not elapsed to identify true effects. He said a study which showed how badly we have been hurt by leaks might be able to influence policy in the same way that clearly demonstrative studies have done in the technology transfer area. [redacted] asked for suggestions on study areas. Several were mentioned in subsequent discussion.

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[redacted] reminded members that agencies would likely be hesitant to let outside task force members have access to data those agencies considered particularly sensitive. [redacted]

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[redacted] Maj. Andrews suggested that long-term effects would best be perceived by analysts reviewing collection "take" to prepare finished intelligence. [redacted] DIA would prefer a sharply focused study. [redacted]

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[redacted] suggested that SECOM, through its UDIS, task selected agencies to study their own data bases, and have the results assembled by the SECOM staff for review by the DCI and possible use by him with the National Security Council. He recommended that NSA review COMINT leaks and CIA HUMINT ones.

[redacted] said he thought that would be a feasible approach, and suggested [redacted] a good subject. [redacted] suggested CIA clandestine operations as another. Members agreed that any study should include vivid examples in order to gain high-level attention. [redacted] asked if any U. S. Ambassadors were known to have protested damage to country programs caused by leaks. Col. Press said he thought [redacted] serve as an example.

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[redacted] said it appeared that NSA and CIA would be the agencies to be tasked, and asked Messrs. [redacted] to discuss arrangements with [redacted]

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[redacted] and to keep the staff informed through [redacted] also asked Mr. Stigers to check with State/INR analysts to see if they could identify any long-term effects of leaks through their review of collection reports. [redacted]

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ITEM 4 Proposed TEMPEST Manual

[] noted the September dissemination to members of the proposed TEMPEST security manual for SCI contractors, developed by NSA, CIA and DIA COMSEC personnel. He also noted dissemination of the "TEMPEST position paper" prepared for the Industrial Security Working Group (ISWG). He recalled that members had spoken positively of the "zone of control" concept and the "common sense" approach stated by the NSA briefers on this subject at our October seminar. At that time, members made it clear that those approaches need to be reflected in the manual in specific terms so they can be applied in the field with reasonable uniformity. CIA's COMSEC Division was asked to address some member concerns, and their response was sent out with the agenda for this meeting. Lastly, [] noted receipt of a memorandum from Mr. Anderson detailing a number of reservations on the draft manual. NSA is addressing them. [] said members need to discuss what response SECOM will make to the recommendation that we endorse the draft manual. He advised that if members want clarifications, it may be desirable to set up an ad hoc working group to explore the issues and report to SECOM early in 1983. []

[] advised that the draft manual reflected a united approach by NSA, CIA and CIA COMSEC officers, and he doubted they were prepared to relax the proposed standards to the point recommended by the ISWG. [] noted that national policy gave agencies responsibility for implementing their own TEMPEST programs. He said the results were varied, and that those agencies whose resources were limited tended to put an undue burden on their contractors for TEMPEST implementation. [] commented that such an approach was the logical impetus for the ISWG paper, and noted the disparities between what agencies sometimes apply to themselves and what they demand from their contractors. [] said CIA had asked the FBI for data on the domestic technical threat. The "Taylormaid" report was the response. [] commented that the report didn't provide much threat data. [] said what was reported was all that could be determined. Col. Press noted large expenditures for TEMPEST-approved equipment, and questioned the need if the threat could not be established. [] suggested the need to be concerned about the Soviets moving into the technical threat area as U. S. counterintelligence measures gradually close off their access to other collection targets.

[] commenting on the Taylormaid report, suggested the possibility that resources are being wasted if TEMPEST approvals must be based upon the highest standards only because there are not enough inspectors to prescribe individual safeguards for each installation. He noted a parallel with the GAO finding that DIS's inability to quickly complete clearance actions resulted in the loss of millions of dollars in unproductive time spent awaiting clearances. Mr. Rubino said he believes TEMPEST countermeasures have a prophylactic effect, and suggested that the issue is whether

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we would guard against what the U. S. can do or what we believe the Soviets can do. [redacted]

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[redacted] observed that discussion showed the issue was broader than could be dealt with by minor changes to the draft manual. No one responded to his request for volunteers to staff a small working group to address the problem. He stated that we would later contact those members who appear to have significant interests in this area to seek their assistance and advice. He noted that SECOM's equities in this area were limited to intelligence applications, and advised that the National Communications Security Committee, which is responsible for COMSEC applications of TEMPEST, is responding to IG/CM tasking on the subject. [redacted]

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ITEM 5 New Business

A. Mr. Smith introduced Lt. Col. Raymond Abel as a new Air Force alternate and the deputy to Col. Mercuro. [redacted]

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B. Mr. Rubino advised that Judge Lewis - presiding over the first trial of Edwin Wilson - had shown a positive attitude toward security measures discussed with him under possible application of the "graymail" Act. As a different issue, Mr. Rubino said he believed SECOM-originated security policies and procedures should bear a minimum security classification. [redacted]

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C. [redacted] said he was concerned about staff capability to support SECOM subcommittees, particularly in the technical and physical areas.

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ITEM 6 Next Meeting

[redacted] advised that the first of the special meetings members asked for on subcommittee program presentations was scheduled for Friday, 3 December, at 10:00 a.m., in room 7D-32, CIA Headquarters. He said [redacted] would report on the Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Subcommittee and [redacted] on the Computer Security Subcommittee. [redacted] noted that [redacted] had been scheduled to address R&D matters at this meeting, but a personal commitment forced postponement. [redacted] reminded members of the SECOM Christmas lunch scheduled for Wednesday, 15 December, at the Ft. McNair Officers Club. He said a reservation form would be disseminated soon. [redacted]

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